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The Principle of Individuation
In Schleiermacher’s Spinozism as well as in his Short Presentation of
the Spinozistic System, both from around 1793–94, he continues his
preoccupation with the question of personal identity. In On Freedom
Schleiermacher was unable to provide an account that made sense of
the idea that an agent is the initiator of an action. In that essay he
realized that in denying transcendental freedom and espousing deter-
minism, the agency of the agent disappears, since the causal grounds
for each action ultimately can be traced back to events pre-existing
the agent. Each representation and desire that arises in the psyche is
itself causally necessitated by a prior mental state of the agent, and the
first mental state of an agent would itself be the product of efficient
causes that preceded the existence of the agent in time. On this view
the “agency” of the agent “dissolves into infinitely many infinitesi-
mally small external forces that leave us with nothing to think of
as firmly active in the subject” (KGA I.1, 257; 42–3). In Spinozism
and in The Short Presentation, Schleiermacher embraces a position
fully consonant with this result. Specifically, he argues that there are
no genuine individuals, and hence no real (noumenal) agents. As
such, there is no way to make sense of the notion that an agent is
the initiator of an action. In Spinozism he argues for three principle
claims. First, there are no justifiable criteria for making judgments
concerning the identity of things. Second, there are no justifiable
criteria for making judgments regarding the identity of persons. And
third, there are no individuals. Because there are no individuals, there
must be only one substance in which everything inheres. Only it has
complete reality. His position is developed in relation to the views of
Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and Jacobi. He rejects Leibniz’s views, defends
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Spinoza against many of Jacobi’s charges, and adopts Kant’s critical,
transcendental idealism as his own.1 He argues that Kant’s critical
principles, if thought through to their logical conclusion, ultimately
lead to a qualified Spinozism.
This chapter, as well as the following one, will be devoted prin-
cipally to a careful examination of the arguments Schleiermacher
proffers in Spinozism; the material in the Short Presentation will be
addressed as well, but mostly insofar as it sheds light on the former
essay. In this chapter, I will focus on Schleiermacher’s argument,
directed principally against Leibniz and the Leibnizians, that there
is no such a thing as a principle of individuation. In defending this
claim, Schleiermacher provides two major arguments, one episte-
mological in nature, and another that is metaphysical. First, I very
briefly discuss the historical context of Schleiermacher’s two pieces on
Spinoza, and then proceed to provide an analysis of Schleiermacher’s
epistemological and metaphysical arguments against the principle of
individuation.
1 In her book The Living God: Schleiermacher’s Theological Appropropriation of
Spinoza, Julia Lamm calls Schleiermacher’s position a “post-Kantian Spinozism.”
Lamm identifies four themes she believes Schleiermacher develops here and car-
ries through into his later material: monism, determinism, realism, and non-
anthropomorphism. The interpretation I offer in this book differs significantly from
Lamm’s. While the first chapter of Lamm’s book, devoted to the Spinoza essays,
provides a good overview of the themes that Schleiermacher treats in the essays, it
does not sufficiently emphasize that Schleiermacher’s principle concern in Spinozism
is to argue that there are no genuine individuals and to counter some of the Leibnizian
positions adopted by Jacobi. Schleiermacher, however, continued his preoccupation
with the question of the individual in the Monologen, revising the position taken in
Spinozism in significant ways. As has been recently argued by George di Giovanni in
Freedom and Religion in Kant and His Immediate Successors, the problems of freedom
and the individual stood at the heart of philosophical disputes in Germany in the
late eighteenth century. Di Giovanni takes account of the “set of problems that drove
popular philosophy—notably the problem of how to reconcile individual identity
with the mechanism of nature” (54). In this and the following chapters I argue that
one of Schleiermacher’s main goals is to understand the relation of the individual to
both the world and to the absolute, both in theoretical and practical terms. This is
a dominant theme continued in the Speeches and the Monologen, and is significantly
echoed in The Christian Faith as well. Significantly, it was Jacobi who had sounded
the alarm regarding the question of the individual. Although he disagreed with him
on fundamental points, Schleiermacher held Jacobi in high regard and had even
hoped to dedicate the first edition of The Christian Faith to him. It is no surprise
that Schleiermacher, too, dedicated significant energies to understanding the place of
the individual in light of the attraction that Spinoza’s insight held for him.
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THE BACKGROUND
Schleiermacher begins Spinozism by copying forty-four of F. H.
Jacobi’s paragraphs in which Jacobi had attempted to present
“Spinoza’s system in its true form and according to the intrinsic coher-
ence of its parts.”2 These forty-four paragraphs represent the second,
and longest, exposition of Spinozism and its spirit presented by Jacobi
in his On Spinoza’s Doctrine in Letters to Moses Mendelssohn.3 Jacobi
had argued, famously, that all systematic philosophy leads to fatalism
and atheism, and that the philosophy of Spinoza was the clearest and
most consistently developed position that results from taking rational
thinking to its logical conclusion. Left to its own devices, human
reason would end up affirming pantheism. Spinoza is a “consistent
rationalist,”4 and “Spinozism is atheism.” Furthermore, “all ways of
demonstration end in fatalism.”5 As a defender of orthodox theism
and freedom of the will, Jacobi argued that these dangerous and
fatalistic views could only be refuted through a “salto mortale,” or
leap of faith.
On Spinoza’s Doctrine in Letters toMosesMendelssohn had appeared
in 1785, the same year asMendelssohn’sMorgenstunden, and contains
Jacobi’s correspondence with Mendelssohn, in which the question of
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s Spinozism was discussed at length. Less-
ing had died on February 15, 1781. When Jacobi had heard through
Elise Reimarus that Mendelssohn planned to write something on
Lessing, he became rather anxious. He did not want Lessing to be used
as a witness in favor of the theism of the German Enlightenment, and
he feared that Lessing’s real views would be suppressed. Confident
that Elise would relay the message to Mendelssohn, he wrote to Elise,
2 Gérard Vallée, The Spinoza Conversations between Lessing and Jacobi, 118. Vallée’s
book contains translations of important parts of Mendelssohn’s Morgenstunden and
An die Freunde Lessing’, as well as of F. H. Jacobi’s Über die Lehre des Spinoza’s
and Wider Mendelssohns Beschuldigungen. The material is translated from Heinrich
Scholz’s Die Hauptschriften zum Pantheismusstreit zwischen Jacobi und Mendelssohn.
3 The forty four paragraphs are in Jacobi’s April 1785 letter to Mendelssohn. Cf.
Scholz, Hauptschriften, 141–65. These are, unfortunately, left out of Vallée’s transla-
tion. A complete English translation of Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to
Herr Moses Mendelssohn can be found in F. H. Jacobi: The Main Philosophical Writings
and the Novel Allwill, translated and edited by George di Giovanni.
4 Vallée, The Spinoza Conversations, 12. 5 Ibid. 123.
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You know perhaps, and if you do not know I confide it to you here sub
rosa, that Lessing in his final days was a firm Spinozist. It is conceivable
that Lessing may have expressed this view to others; in that case it would be
necessary for Mendelssohn, in the memorial he intends to dedicate to him,
either to avoid certain matters totally or at least to treat themwith the utmost
caution.6
Mendelssohn took the bait, and asked for more information. In
November of 1783, Jacobi sent Mendelssohn a long report of his con-
versation with Lessing. Jacobi reports that Lessing told him that “the
orthodox concepts of divinity are no longer for me; I cannot stand
them. Hen kai Pan! I know nought else.” And to top it off, Lessing
claimed, “If I am to call myself by anybody’s name, then I know none
better” [than the name of Spinoza].7 A long correspondence between
Jacobi and Mendelssohn ensued, finally published by Jacobi in Über
die Lehre des Spinoza. Among other things, the book contains Jacobi’s
understanding of the “spirit of Spinozism,” as well as his arguments
that Spinozism is equivalent to atheism, and that all rationalism,
including that of Leibniz, eventually dissolved into Spinozism.8
In understanding Spinozism, it is important to remember that
Schleiermacher is directly responding to Jacobi, and that Jacobi
espoused versions of key Leibnizian doctrines. Jacobi understood
Leibniz as having thought of the monads as vinculum compositionis,9
6 Vallée, The Spinoza Conversations, 5. 7 Ibid. 9–10.
8 For a more in-depth discussion of the Pantheism Controversy, see Frederick C.
Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte, as well as George
di Giovanni, Freedom and Religion in Kant and His Immediate Successors, especially
pp. 137–51. Paul Franks also provides an excellent discussion of Jacobi’s influence and
the question of post-Kantian Spinozism in All or Nothing, 84–145.
9 In his February 1712 letter to Des Bosses, Leibniz notes the following regarding
the vinculum substantiale: “If the vinculum substantiale of monads did not exist, all
bodies, together with all of their qualities, would be nothing but well-founded phe-
nomena, like a rainbow or an image in a mirror, in a word, continual dreams perfectly
in agreement with one another, and in this alone would consist the reality of those
phenomena.” G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 198–9. For Leibniz, the vinculum
explains the underlying nature and per se unity of corporeal substance. The best,
most nuanced discussion of the role of this idea in Leibniz’s philosophy can be found
in Robert M. Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, 299–307. Adams, however,
concludes that Leibniz “never had a deep personal commitment to the view that there
are corporeal substances, one per se” (307). Jacobi, on the other hand, understood the
vinculum as guaranteeing both the principle of individuality and of personhood: it is
the principle of the indivisibility of the unity of the manifold, and he determined this
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that is, the monads supply a principle of the indivisible unity of the
manifold. Jacobi called this principle the “I.” This I “distinguishes
itself from all experiences and representations” and provides unity
to the manifold given through consciousness of the world. According
to Jacobi “all truly real things are individuals or single things, and as
such are (a) living essences, principles (b) perceptive and (c) active,
and they are outside one another.”10 He stressed the active character
of these living principles, that is, their freedom, and he conceives
of the individuals as spontaneously reacting to one another. At the
same time, Jacobi stressed the community of all individuals: all the
individuals reciprocally determine one another.11 Because of their
nature, “the concepts of unity and plurality, of activity and passivity,
of extension and succession” are innate in individuals.12 Jacobi also
adopted the Leibnizian notion of the pre-established harmony.13
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM
In the following passage cited by Schleiermacher, Jacobi comments
upon both Leibniz and Spinoza:
Nevertheless, Bourget believed he had discovered a furthering of Spinozism,
or rather of its spirit, in even this new system. Leibniz answered him: I do
not see how you want to bring out Spinozism here. On the contrary, it
is precisely through the monads that Spinozism is overcome. For so many
monads, somany real substances or indestructible, and at once livingmirrors
of the universe, or concentric worlds, exist. Contrary to this, according to
Spinoza, there can be only one single substance. Were there no monads, then
Spinoza would be correct. All outside of God would be ignored, and would
disappear as an accidental attribute, for the things would be lacking their
principle as the “I.” On this point see Eilert Herms, Herkunft, Entfaltung, und erste
Gestalt des Systems der Wissenschaften bei Schleiermacher, 129.
10 F. H. Jacobi, Werke, Volume , 261. All translations from Jacobi’s Werke are my
own.
11 Jacobi,Werke, 1,225ff. 12 Jacobi,Werke, , 261.
13 George di Giovanni provides an excellent discussion of Jacobi’s philosophy in
“The Unfinished Philosophy of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi,” the introductory chapter
to F. H. Jacobi: TheMain Philosophical Writings and the NovelAllwill. He also discusses
Jacobi’s philosophy in Freedom and Religion.
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own ground of endurance or substance, which is given through the monads.
This is completely right. Spinozism can only be grasped with success from
the point of view of its individuation, in which case then it must be replaced
by either Leibniz’s monads or the Eleatic acatalepsy. In his (Spinoza’s) system
the individua, or individual things, are yet so little as the Godhead itself,
which brings forth the infinite from the infinite in an absolutely necessary
way. But he gives no justification of the inner possibility of such individual
things in the absolute continuum. He gives no account of their division and
of the community of their effects, and this on account of an astonishing
war of all against all bringing with it a fleeting individuality that unites, in
a tangled way, all unity in and with the infinite.14 (KGA I.1, 547)
In both Spinozism and the Short Presentation, Schleiermacher pro-
ceeds to defend Spinoza, and argues that Leibniz’s philosophy is not
an improvement over that of Spinoza. The principal question at issue,
according to Schleiermacher, is whether we have grounds for thinking
that there exist individuals having their own ground of endurance
or subsistence in themselves.15 Schleiermacher adopts the Kantian
distinction between phenomena and noumena, and he does not deny
that individuals appear as phenomena. What he denies is that there
exist objects that in themselves are individuals and that have within
them their own ground of endurance. He marshals several arguments
for why we do not have good grounds for thinking that there are
discrete individuals. In what follows I will discuss each of these.
14 All translations from Spinozism and the Short Presentation, which can be found
in KGA I.1, are my own. All future references to these two pieces will be indicated by
KGA I.1 with page numbers following, and will be internal to the text.
15 Adams identifies another, related problem in assessing the relation of Leibniz
to Spinoza. The question is whether “the world is something external or additional
to God” (126). In his book Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, Adams provides an
account that is historically sensitive to Leibniz’s changing views. The earlier Leibniz,
writing in 1676, “flatly affirms the Spinozistic idea that finite things are only modes”
(129). By 1688 Leibniz has, however, changed his views. In his paper “On the Abstract
and the Concrete” (c.1688) Leibniz argues that there must be a genuine distinction
between God and creatures, for God’s reality is infinite, that of creatures is finite.
Because the powers are distinct (one is infinite, the other finite), there must be two
subjects to which these powers can be ascribed. As Adams notes: “We are left, I think,
with the following answer to the question whether Leibniz’s conception of God as ens
perfectissimum has, inescapably, Spinozistic implications: it does not. The relation of
the limited attributes of creatures to the absolute attributes of God is not the relation
of mode to attribute, since they exclude each other from any one subject, by virtue of
the negation involved in the creaturely attributes” (134).
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He first notes that two questions must be distinguished: first
whether individual finite things have substance, and second, whether
they are substances. He admits that all finite things have substance,
but denies that they are substances (KGA I.1, 547). A thing may
have substance insofar as the one substance grounding everything
is its ground, or insofar as it is made up of a part of the universal
substance. This however, does not mean that it is a substance. For
something to be a genuine substance, it must have its own principle
of endurance or subsistence separating it from other substances, that
is, it must have its own principle of individuation. The first question,
that of whether things have substance, has nothing to do with the
principle of individuation itself, “for if it is granted that a thing A
has something substantial in itself, it does not thereby follow, that,
and to what degree, it is to be considered as a separate thing” (KGA
I.1, 547–8). Schleiermacher contrasts Spinoza’s understanding of how
things possess substance with that of Leibniz: “the latter says: yes, the
finite (extended) things have something substantial in them, namely
the monads. The former says: yes, what is substantial in them is the
being which is a part of the universal substance” (KGA I.1, 548).
Schleiermacher argues that the problemwith Leibniz’s position, how-
ever, is that it provides us with no way of identifying the principle
of individuation. Leibniz’s idea of monads does not clarify “how
that which I recognize through pure reason as substance is unified”
(KGA, I.1, 548). In other words he fails to provide adequate criteria
through which we can determine that something is an independent
substance.
Schleiermacher assumes a thoroughly Kantian standpoint when
he poses his question to Leibniz concerning the principle of indi-
viduation. Our continuously changing perceptions are “given to us
as sensation and change of sensation” (KGA I.1, 549); moreover, the
“whole world of sense is there in and through you” (KGA I.1, 550),
that is, the world of sense is given to us in and through modifications
of the mind. The question then becomes how the continual flux of
perceptions can generate our everyday objective experience of tables
and chairs. Leibniz’s principles do not make clear to him “how and
why I consider the objects given to me in outer experience as separate
from one another, how I thereby come to combine into an objective
unity its manifold, and on what it depends that I connect exactly this
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many and exactly this manifold?” (KGA I.1, 548). Although Leibniz
has shown “how and that many substances are possible” (KGA I.1,
548) his positing of the monads remains a mere hypothesis. Schleier-
macher asks,
But tell us something about how and why you distinguish the phenomena as
separate objects. Does this distinction have to do with the one combination,
so that you would know you have grasped precisely that which results from
a monad connection through your representation? How might you know
this? Or does it have to do with this: that just what you see as your object
belongs to a common central monad? How do you know this then, and how
have you achieved this knowledge of monads through which to separate the
individuals from one another? (KGA I.1, 548)
In other words, Schleiermacher asks, how do we know that the
activity of the understanding, in producing phenomenally distinct
objects such as tables and chairs, actually hooks up with what are
metaphysically real individuals, that is, individuals in themselves?
Leibniz believed that we are in contact with God alone and that
our knowledge of all other things derived from our relation to God.
In §28 of his Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz notes that, “there
is no external cause acting on us except God alone, and he alone
communicates himself to us immediately in virtue of our contin-
ual dependence . . . It can then be said that God is our immediate
external object and that we see all things by him.”16 Leibniz explains
our ability to know other monads through God’s conservation of
the ideas of such monads in us. It is likely this idea that Schleier-
macher has in mind when he notes “just what you see as your
object belongs to a common central monad.” According to Leibniz,
we know of other individuals and their states in virtue of the pre-
established harmony: “But in simple substances the influence of one
monad over another can only be ideal, and can only produce its
effect through God’s intervention, when in the ideas of God a monad
rightly demands that God take it into account in regulating the others
from the beginning of things” (Monadology, §51).17 From the very
16 Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 59. On Schleiermacher’s access to this text as well
as to these ideas, see note 3, chapter 4, “The World is the Mirror of the Self.” As I
note in the introduction, it is only in 1797–8 that Schleiermacher comes to study the
original Leibnizian texts.
17 Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 219.
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beginning God harmonizes all monads and their states with one
another, and it is through this harmony that our knowledge of other
individuals is guaranteed. Schleiermacher complains that this way of
understanding the matter, however, remains a mere hypothesis. If
we begin with the fact of the continual flux of perceptions in inner
sense, there is no way to know that the phenomenal individuals we
experience map onto individual things in themselves. The “vinculum
of the monads is something so completely unknown and undeter-
mined” (KGA I.1, 548–9). Hence Schleiermacher concludes, “The
most that one can admit is that, objectively, Leibniz solved the prob-
lem through a hypothesis, namely, of how individual things could be
possible in the continuum of extension and of consciousness.” How-
ever, Schleiermacher claims, Leibniz did not touch upon the corre-
sponding subjective question: “through which effects of these things
on us are we constrained to make this distinction in experience as
well?” (KGA I.1, 548).
Schleiermacher takes what he understands as Kant’s account of
the “subjective ground of individuation”18 as decisive, and notes that
is something “of which we will all be in agreement, for hereafter
no one can ground it validly to the exclusion of his system” (KGA
I.1, 550). Schleiermacher thereby explains how we come to have the
phenomenal experience of individuals that we do in terms of Kant’s
analogies of experience. These analogies provide an account of how
and why the continuous change of perceptions given in inner sense
must be interpreted in such a way that we think of phenomenal
substances as (a) enduring, (b) changing in accordance with natural
laws, and (c) existing simultaneously and in thoroughgoing inter-
action, or community, with one another. Schleiermacher notes that
“According to your currently reigning mode of thinking, you say,
in fact, that the application of the laws of the understanding makes
experience out of these perceptions, and particularly the analogies of
experience constrain you not only to combine the idea of a necessary
connection between an earlier state and a later state with each change,
but also to think of something real and persisting as grounding
18 When Schleiermacher speaks of the “subjective ground of individuation,” he
is referring to the phenomenal individuation of Kant’s appearances. He takes this
ground to be “subjective” insofar as phenomena are the result of the operations of
the synthesis of the imagination.
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each sensation” (KGA I.1, 549). Kant’s first analogy of experience
stipulated that time determination requires us to posit the existence
of a persisting substance underlying the changes of appearance.19
According to the second analogy, time determination also requires
that we be able to provide an objective account of the succession of
changes in an appearance. Such an account of the order of changes
must be distinguishable from the order given in the apprehension
of successive representations. Kant argues that in order for such an
objective account to be possible, we must think of all alterations as
occurring in accordance with the law of cause and effect. Lastly, Kant’s
third analogy stipulates that in order for us to be able to think that
the sequence of our perceptions is grounded in an object, we must
think of substances as in space and in thoroughgoing interaction, or
community with one another. These three analogies, having to do
with persistence, succession, and simultaneity, must be assumed if
objective experience is to be possible, that is, if we are to be able to
distinguish between our subjective apprehension of perceptions and
the appearances as objects of experience.
Schleiermacher’s point is that these analogies only give an account
of phenomenal reality, that is, of how wemust connect the representa-
tions given to us in sensation in order to arrive at objective experience.
The analogies in no way guarantee that this phenomenal reality hooks
up with the way things are in themselves. Hence he notes,
You may not claim that the ground of the plurality of substances in space
lies in the plurality of substances in themselves, for this claim would contra-
dict your remaining doctrine. Even less may you give this reason for your
19 This is because (a) we are aware of time only in and through the relation of
the representations given in inner sense to one another; as such time cannot be
perceived. (b) The representations given to inner sense are continuously changing and
do not endure. (c) However, only through that which persists does duration acquire
a magnitude. (d) Time itself cannot be that which endures, that is, time cannot be
the changing thing underlying the changes since it is that through which the changes
are to be measured. (e) What persists must therefore be the object itself, that is,
the substance. (f) Hence, everything that changes can belong only to theway in which
this substance or substances exist. (g) This further implies that because substance
is the substratum of everything real and always remains the same, its quantity in
nature can be neither increased nor destroyed. I provide a detailed analysis of Kant’s
first analogy and its relation to his refutation of idealism in my chapter “On Some
Presumed Gaps in Kant’s Refutation of Idealism” in Rameil (ed.), Metaphysik und
Kritik.
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subjective perceptions of the plurality of finite substances (phenomena),
since the whole world of sense is in and through you. How then does it come
about that you reduce your perceptions to determinate objects, individuals?
You answer that this stems from the original synthesis of the imagination,
which gives unity to the manifold. Since by itself it does not brand each
individual sensation as an individual, and yet also does not collect them
all together under a single unity, what then is the ground of your opera-
tion? What justifies their separation? Thus, if for Leibniz individuation is
explained only through a shaky hypothesis, and is thereby also not something
solid and completely true, then for you it is something completely arbitrary,
and yet belongs to that which you alone call real and certain.
(KGA I. 1, 549–50)
Schleiermacher here seems to be directly taking issue with Jacobi.
He claims Jacobi cannot consistently affirm that the plurality of sub-
stances in space is grounded in the plurality of things in themselves,
“for this claim would contradict your remaining doctrine.” Jacobi
did believe that phenomena were grounded in things in themselves.
He did not, however, hold to the Kantian-like views Schleiermacher
seems to be attributing to him, and which would pose difficulties for
such a view.
To judge from what he says in Spinozism, it is unclear whether
Schleiermacher was fully acquainted with Jacobi’s doctrines at this
point, or whether he misrepresents Jacobi’s position as a rhetorical
strategy. For example, he assumes that Jacobi agrees with him con-
cerning how we arrive at the “subjective principle of individuation.”
In invoking the analogies to support this “subjective principle,” it is
clear that Schleiermacher has Kant’s doctrine in mind, and Schleier-
macher proceeds as if Jacobi must agree with Kant’s critical idealism
as Schleiermacher understands it.20 However, Jacobi’s own doctrines
were quite different from Kant’s. Specifically, Jacobi adhered to a
direct, unmediated realism. He denied that we arrived at the conclu-
sion that things exist through any deductive process; he claimed there
is an immediate connection between our conviction of the existence
of things and our representations. This unmediated conviction of
existence extends to both our own existence and to the existence of
20 Schleiermacher’s discussion of the analogies as supporting the subjective prin-
ciple of individuation is misleading, since for Kant the analogies of experience are
conditions of the possibility of objective experience.
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things outside of us. We become aware of things outside of us “with
the same certainly with which we become aware of ourselves.”21 Not
only do we arrive at the conviction of the existence of ourselves and
of things outside of us in the same way, that is, without any media-
tion, we also arrive at both convictions simultaneously. According to
Jacobi, we become aware of both our self-consciousness and things
“in the same instant, in the same indivisible moment, without before
or after, without any operation of the understanding, yes, without the
conviction of the concept of cause and effect even remotely beginning
in them.”22 In 1787 Jacobi wrote,
The thing brings just so much to the awareness of consciousness, as con-
sciousness does to the awareness of the thing. I experience that I am, and
that something is outside of me, in the same indivisible instant: and in
this instant my soul is no more affected by the thing as it is by itself.
No representation, no conclusion mediates this double revelation. Noth-
ing enters the soul between the awareness of the real outside of it. Rep-
resentations do not yet exist; they first appear afterwards in reflection, as
shadows of things that were present. We can also always lead them back to
the real from which they are taken and which they presuppose. We must
thereby go back to the real each time if we wish to know whether they are
true.23
Jacobi, then, rejects Kant’s analogies of experience, for these clearly
involve the activity of the understanding. Moreover, Kant’s refuta-
tion of idealism, coming as it does after the analogies in the sec-
ond edition of the first Critique, presupposes the analogies. In his
refutation of idealism Kant sought to show that awareness of the
time determination of inner experience presupposes outer experi-
ence, that is, experience of things outside the self. Both Kant and
Jacobi are in agreement that awareness of the self is intrinsically tied
up with awareness of things outside the self. They disagree, however,
on how this comes about. According to Kant, the activity of the
understanding is required in order to distinguish objective experience
frommymerely subjective apprehensions. Self-consciousness and the
distinction between self and world thereby depend upon the activ-
ity of the understanding. According to Jacobi, on the other hand,
21 Jacobi,Werke, , 143; 1,211. 22 Jacobi,Werke, , 176.
23 Ibid. 175.
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we have a direct, unmediated awareness of both self and world. No
representations and no activity of the understanding mediate this
awareness.24 Representations are themselves mere shadows of this
immediate, direct awareness.25
Schleiermacher’s argumentative strategy is to assume that Jacobi
must agree that what we have to work with is a manifold of sensa-
tions on which the understanding must operate in order for objective
24 In Freedom and Religion, di Giovanni provides a useful discussion of Jacobi’s
attempt to discover “the right formula for representing how an experiencing subject,
in becoming aware of himself, equally becomes conscious of the presence of an exter-
nal world.” At the heart of this formula is Jacobi’s insight that fundamental awareness
of the self is given in action. The self knows itself immediately in the feeling of power
that the subject has of itself when it acts. As such, Jacobi analyzes a fundamental,
existential dimension of human being in the world. His formula representing how
experience is possible, found in his 1787 book entitled David Hume on Faith, or
Idealism and Realism, a Dialogue is summarized by di Giovanni as follows: “(1) Self-
awareness originates in a subject’s feeling of power. (2) This feeling immediately
implicates the presence for the subject of an external something that exists in itself
and interferes with the felt power, but at the same time provides the feeling with a
reality check. (3) Representation is called into play as the reflective attempt on the
part of the subject to sort out the difference between his own self and the external
things resisting his power” (83).
25 Schleiermacher’s notes on Jacobi’s work, from about the same period—1793–
4—show that he is aware of Jacobi’s direct realism and his arguments for it. Schleier-
macher copied the following from Jacobi’s David Hume über den Glauben oder Ideal-
ismus und Realismus (1787):“Therefore, however, as a realist I must say: all knowledge
could come completely from belief alone, since things must be given to me before I
am in a position to recognize relations” (KGA I.1, 595). Schleiermacher also copies
Jacobi’s arguments that certainty of outer things must be an unmediated certainty.
The Kantian philosophers, according to Jacobi, are merely “empirical realists” but
they are not “genuine realists.” And he continues: “The validity of empirical evidence
is just that which is in question. That things appear to us as outside of us requires no
proof. That, however, these things are thereby not pure appearances in us, not mere
determinations of our own self and thereby nothing as representations of something
outside us, but rather that they are representations in us that relate to beings outside us
really existing in themselves and that are taken from them—against this not only can
doubts arise, but it is often the case that the strongest understanding cannot overcome
these doubts through rational grounds. Your unmediated certainty of outer things
would thereby be a blind certainty according to the analogy of my belief” (KGA I.1,
596). In Spinozism Schleiermacher makes no mention of this stance, namely of the
possibility of a direct, unmediated realism, and of Jacobi’s claim that we have this
direct access to things through belief. If he had been aware of this at this point, one
would expect that he would have dealt with it when he asked the question of how it is
possible to distinguish between inner sense and outer appearances. It therefore seems
to me that he must have written Spinozism before he began to think about Jacobi’s
direct realism.
03-Marina-c02 OUP191-Marina (Typeset by SPi, Delhi) page 56 of 75 March 6, 2008 11:38
56 Transformation of the Self
experience to be possible. Schleiermacher’s question to Jacobi, “How
then does it come about that you reduce your perceptions to deter-
minate objects, individuals?” (KGA I.1, 550) only makes sense on
the assumption that Jacobi had adopted key elements of Kant’s tran-
scendental idealism. It is clear, however, that Jacobi rejected most of
the critical philosophy. In its place was his direct realism. Hence the
question of how we can be certain that our phenomenal experience
of individuals is grounded in things as they are in themselves is not
really an issue for him. This is because according to Jacobi’s system,
we never really begin with phenomenal experience. We begin with
a direct awareness of the things as they are in themselves. Just like
our representations, phenomena are mere shadows of that which we
already directly apprehend. The question of how we can move from
our phenomenal awareness of individuals to individuals as they are
in themselves does not, then, cut against his system.
Contra Jacobi’s position, Schleiermacher affirms “our whole man-
ner of separating things into individuals is in no way an effect of this
whole from the outside, but is rather an inner action. It is thereby
either determined in accordance with our necessary laws grounded
in representations, or is a wholly blind instinct. Leibniz must thereby
throw his lot in with Kant . . . ” (KGA I.1, 552). Schleiermacher affirms
that the manifold of sensation that comes to us from the outside does
not bring with it its own interpretation. What is given to us through
the senses is “sensation and change of sensation.” This explains why
our “perceptions are not continuous” (KGA I.1, 549), that is, the
sensations we experience are continuously in flux. Moreover, since
we first begin with our subjective apprehension of these sensations,
Schleiermacher asks the Kantian question “how would you have
arrived at the distinction between inner sense and outer intuitions?”
(KGA I.1, 552). Kant’s answer to this question is the analogies of
experience. As we have noted above, Schleiermacher refers to these
as well and is in agreement with Kant on this point.
How is the distinction between self and outer objects possible?
Given that our “perceptions are not continuous,” we never have direct
access to that which underlies the continually changing determina-
tions of the appearance, for we do not have a continuous percep-
tion of the underlying substrate. We merely infer it. For that matter,
we have no access to a permanent representation of the self that
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endures throughout the change in its representations (considered as
its determinations). And this inference to substance as that which
underlies the changing determinations of the thing is a result of the
application of the necessary laws of the understanding to what is given
in sensation. It is therefore the result of our own activity and is not
merely given to us from the outside. In all objective knowledge of the
appearances, the synthesis of the imagination is continuously at work.
For example, how the visual field is integrated with the auditory and
tactile fields is the work of this synthesis. The perceptions that come
to us from the visual field do not, in themselves, contain those of the
auditory or tactile fields. Schleiermacher notes, “You separate the
thing, viewed as chaos, in several objects in accordance with the dif-
ferent modes of perception. It is at least difficult to grasp how
the imagination should thereby come to connect that into a unity
which does not allow itself to be taken together, because it does not
grasp it [viz., the visual field] in another [viz., the tactile field], and
they cannot be made to follow one another” (KGA I.1, 553). What
Schleiermacher calls chaos is the uninterpreted manifold of percep-
tion. Moreover, he argues, not only are the perceptual fields, insofar
as they are purely given, not integrated with one another, but the
data from each field also require the activity of the understanding
in order for this data to make sense. Schleiermacher affirms, “the eye
in itself is not skilled to distinguish objects. It shows the unpracticed
seer everything on a single plane and distinguishes only colors. And if
we now need it principally for this [distinguishing objects] this then
happens, so to speak, only through a shortened kind of calculation,
the rules of which we could only have come by through long practice.
Even so little touch. It distinguishes only degrees of hardness and
fluidity” (KGA I.1, 553). The upshot of all of this is that, contrary to
Jacobi’s views, Schleiermacher believes we have no unmediated access
to things.We have immediate access to our perceptual states, and only
given the activity of the synthesis of the imagination on the manifold
of sense do we come to the ordinary world of tables and chairs. But
if this is the case, what guarantee do we have that the phenomenal
world of tables and chairs actually maps onto things in themselves?
Schleiermacher’s next argument has to do with the nature of
phenomenal individuals. He argues that whatever understanding
we come to have of such individuals is only an approximate,
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probable concept. From the phenomenal point of view, individu-
als are determinate masses. He defines a determinate mass as “the
point of unity of several of these modifications at each moment.”
The modifications he has in mind are those of “movement and rest,
representation and desire” (KGA I.1, 551; cf. 574). It is because we
believe we can identify such a point of unity of these modifications
that we call something an individual. But can such a point of unity
really be identified? The problem is that of the continuous change in
state of the appearances. He tells us, “no particle can remain com-
pletely the same throughout because of continuous change. Rather,
in part the same mass takes on different determinations, and in part
the same determinations pass over into a different mass. Yes, I cannot
even determine which mass is to be regarded as an individual, for
this mass is also divisible in thought” (KGA I.1, 551). The way that
Schleiermacher is thinking of “mass” is in terms of a kind of substrate,
that is, mass seems to be an extended kind of stuff that is the bearer
of the properties, or determinations of a thing. However, we never
have a continuous perception of such a mass. We perceive only its
changing states. But this means that the substratum, shorn of all of
its properties, is not continuously identifiable. It is therefore unclear
how Schleiermacher can assert that different determinations pass over
into the same mass, and that the same determinations pass over into
different masses. How could we possibly know that something is the
same mass, or is a different mass apart from its determinations? If
however, the substratum is thought of as extended, then what remains
continuously identifiable are particular portions of space.
This way of thinking echoes the theory Plato puts forward in the
Timaeus, and Schleiermacher is very likely referring to it here through
his reference to Plato. In the Timaeus Plato had asked, “Do all these
things of which we always say that each of them is something ‘by
itself ’ really exist?” Plato tells us that that which is perceived by the
senses is “constantly borne along, now coming to be in a certain
place and then perishing out of it.” Space, one the other hand, “exists
always and cannot be destroyed. It provides a fixed state for all things
that come to be.”26 On this theory, space is the only continuously
identifiable substrate, and all coming to be and perishing are its
26 Plato, Timaeus, translated by Donald J. Zeyl, in Plato: Complete Works 1255.
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determinations. Space is, as such, the receptacle that “receives into
itself” all becoming. Plato calls belief in the existence of things “by
themselves” the subject matter of true opinion. It is significant that
that is exactly what Schleiermacher calls these here—he tells us that
“Alone, as is said, the practical use confirms that the concept [of
the individual] has no other validity than that of an approximate,
probable concept, and that everything that touches upon it can only
be, as Plato says, a ‰ÔÓ·Ì ·ÎÁËÁÌ” (KGA I.1, 551). On such a view,
the only real individual is the extended, material substrate; in itself
it is indeterminate and one. It is the receptacle for all becoming.27
In the Short Presentation of the Spinozistic System, Schleiermacher
claims that it is the continual coming into being and perishing of
things, that is, their continual flux, that led Spinoza to posit the
unity and eternity of the one substance (KGA I.1, 564, 567). At
this juncture Schleiermacher seems to be reading Spinoza in light
of Plato.
The extended character of this material substrate means that it is
divisible. As noted above, he argues that “Yes, I cannot even determine
which mass is to be regarded as an individual, for this mass is also
divisible in thought.” Given its divisibility, and given the fact that all
the smaller particles out of which such a mass is composed “are not
perfectly homogenous with the whole, . . . this [whole] will therefore
27 In A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, Jonathan Bennet interprets Spinoza as putting
forward a similar theory. He notes “. . . at Spinoza’s most basic metaphysical level
there are no occupants, but only space, its different regions altering in orderly ways.”
In Behind the Geometrical Method, Edwin Curley characterizes this theory, which
he rejects as a proper interpretation of Spinoza, in the following way: “We might
argue, for example, that for Spinoza, as for Descartes, ordinary physical objects are
best viewed as larger or smaller portions of one continuous physical object, portions
distinguishable from their neighbors only because they happen for a time to be quali-
tatively different. Ultimately there is just one extended thing, the whole of the physical
universe (Descartes’s “body in general”). The existence of lesser extended things just
consists in the one extended thing’s being qualified in certain ways at certain times
and places. To say that the piece of wax is a mode of the one substance is to say that
the one extended thing has certain properties at certain places and times . . . ” (31–2).
It is important to note, however, that Schleiermacher did not ultimately read Spinoza
in this way. He recognized the significance of the fact that for Spinoza extension and
thought are mere modes, or expressions of the one substance. As such, while space is
the only continuously identifiable substrate that takes on changing determinations, it
by no means follows that it, and the things that come to be and pass away in it, are to
be completely identified with the absolute. They are, rather, merely an expression of it.
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not be the point of unification for all [the particles] in the same way”
(KGA I.1, 551).28 An extended thing that we think of as an individual
may be composed of different particles that are themselves the “points
of unification” of different forces. Schleiermacher seems to be asking,
why then should we call these composites individuals? Are such com-
posites really individuals, or merely aggregates? On what grounds do
we distinguish individuals from mere aggregates? This is the upshot
of Schleiermacher’s argument when he writes:
You call your body an individual although many parts are completely foreign
to it and do not have any part in its nature. You attribute an identity to it
even though its mass, as well as its character, change almost hourly. You
do not call the air in the room an individual, even though, on account of
its local connectedness, it undergoes a completely different series of changes
than what is separate from it, which then at themoment of separation already
ceases to be homogeneous with it. For example, you do not call several pieces
of wood on a heap an individual, even though they are completely one with
one another in relation to motion and rest. For the most part, you thereby
apply the concept only in a one-sided way and think that you are right. Yet
you must necessarily be aware that the concept is imperfect.
(KGA I.1, 551–2)
Moreover, Schleiermacher argues, things undergo constant change.
If so, then which determinations are we to think of as essential in
order for a thing to preserve its identity? Just how many changes
in determinations can a thing undergo before it loses its identity?
In the end, the whole concept of the individual “falls apart little by
little into those parts to which, together, a proper series of changes
can be attributed. This is thereby the sole canon according to which
your idea of individuals—mediated in part through sight, mediated
in part through touch—realizes itself” (KGA I.1, 553–4). In other
words, what we think of as an individual amounts to a series of
extended parts that together undergo a “proper” series of changes.
But just how do we identify this “proper” series of changes? How are
we to grasp the concept that allows us to unite these parts and their
28 The Short Presentation contains a related argument. He claims that “the plurality
of phenomena” cannot relate to a plurality of noumena. This is because “we can divide
a physical individual in many parts. Were each individual in the world of sense to
correspond to one in the intelligible world, then we must be in a position to increase
the number of things in themselves” (KGA I.1, 574).
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changes such that we think of them as an individual? Such a concept,
Schleiermacher argues, can only be an approximate, probable con-
cept. Even in its “practical use” it is not a “self-contained and perfectly
delimited concept.”
THE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM
So far, we have examined Schleiermacher’s epistemological objection
to the positing of individuals: we have no access to the vinculum of
the monads—that in virtue each monad has its per se unity, and in
virtue of which we can distinguish one from another. We have access
only to phenomena. As such we have no way of knowing what con-
stitutes genuine individuals; this was the principle flaw in Leibniz’s
system. Leibniz’s positing of individuals remained a mere hypothesis.
A long, remarkable passage towards the beginning of Spinozismus
provides insight into Schleiermacher’s metaphysics and why he does
not believe that there are substantial individuals. Jacobi had written:
“What we call sequence or duration is at bottom pure illusion. For
since the real effect is given at once with its complete real cause, it is
differentiated from it only through the representation [der Vorstellung
nach]. Hence sequence and duration must be, in truth, only a certain
form and manner of viewing the manifold in the infinite” (KGA I.1,
526). In response to this Schleiermacher comments:
These words only first lead me to a certain materialistic view, in which
the Spinozistic relation of the noumenon to the phenomenon almost fuses
with the Kantian. This view can also be attributed to the Leibnizian. Let
us suppose a common noumenon lies at the ground of each succession
of appearances, through which we believe we hold an individual in view.
If one also wants to assume only some agreement with the appearance of
the thing, then this noumenon, considered in itself, must contain not only
everything essential that the appearances in the series have in common
with each other, but also that through which each member distinguishes
itself from the others. Therefore, a being that should represent or view this
thing in itself as one, without duration and succession, must therein at once
perceive the preformed seed of all those appearances, the ground of all those
relations of things to others from which the appearances develop themselves
for us. Naturally, however, such a being must have a faculty of representation
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different from our own. It need not be bound to such a limited unity in the
connection of the manifold. This is because, since it [the manifold] contains
parts that we cannot think of in one [representation], this unity would not
be in that representation. For instance, a noumenon lies at the ground of
the seed and all its development up to the maturity of the tree. Such a
being would already see in the seed the whole tree and everything that lay
in between, and all that would be one to it. Because it must relate to one
being, we could think of all that is coincidentally different, which opposes
itself because of its relation to a concept, not as within one another, but
outside one another, [yet] in accordance with each other. In this way the
whole expresses itself to us only in a series of appearances, in which all is
together, which may be together only for our faculty of representation, and
all is separate, which must be separate as a consequence of the same. I believe
that in this presentation nothing is contained that contradicts the Kantian
view of things . . . If a noumenon should be the ground of the whole series
of appearances from seed to tree, then this series may not end here, it must
extend itself to all previous trees and seeds and those that follow, and because
the mechanical and chemical changes in the thing, and the ground of their
relation to others, must be just so well preformed as the organic, which are
so precisely interconnected with it, then this series must extend throughout
the whole world of sense, and we thereby come once more to the Spinozistic
relation. (KGA I.1, 526–7)
Here Schleiermacher makes use of two different ways in which
noumena, or things in themselves, function in Kant’s philosophy. For
Kant, appearances result from the application of the categories, or
concepts of the understanding, to the manifold of sensible intuition.
This has two implications regarding the relation between appearances
and things in themselves that stand in tension with one another. First,
the concept of an appearance implies the idea of a thing in itself. In the
A edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant noted, “appearance can
be nothing for itself and outside our mode of representation. Thus,
if there is not to be a constant circle, the word ‘appearance’ must
already indicate a relation to something the immediate representation
of which is, to be sure, sensible, but which in itself, without this
constitution of our sensibility (on which the form of intuition is
grounded), must be something, i.e. an object independent of sensibil-
ity” (KRV A251–2). An appearance implies something that appears.
The appearance and the thing in itself are not two things, but are,
rather, the same thing considered in different ways in transcendental
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reflection. The thing in itself just is that which appears when we
attempt to think the latter in abstraction from how it must appear
to us given our constitution. The appearance just is the thing in itself
insofar as the latter presents itself to us, given “the constitution of our
sensibility.” In other words, the appearance and the thing in itself are
the same thing considered from two points of view.
Nevertheless, Kant also spoke of appearances as being grounded in,
or having their basis in, things in themselves. After all, they are given
to us in sensation, and it is through sensation that we are affected
by an “unknown something.” In the Prolegomena Kant claims, “And
we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances,
confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we
know not this thing as it is in itself but only know its appearances,
namely, the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown
something. The understanding, therefore, by assuming appearances,
grants the existence of things in themselves also . . . ”29 This is the
second way in which we can think of the relation between the appear-
ances and things in themselves. However, this way of understanding
this relation tempts us to think that things in themselves and appear-
ances are two distinct things. We can be led to think of the former
as the cause or ground of the appearances, and of the appearances as
their effects, where ground and effect somehow stand “outside” one
another. Clearly, there are tensions between both ways of understand-
ing the thing in itself. Both are indisputably found in Kant’s text.30
And Schleiermacher refers to both in his analysis.
The beginning of the passage clearly begins with the second view of
this relation: “a common noumenon lies at the ground of each succes-
sion of appearances.” However, Schleiermacher’s argument depends
in large part on his analysis of the distinct character of our mode of
representation through which appearances are given to us. Appear-
ances are given to us successively. For instance, when I view any
object, such as a house, I first grasp one aspect of it, let us say the
front, and then as I circle around it I apprehend the side and the
back. I grasp the object through successive apprehensions. Through
29 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, [314–15].
30 For a discussion of the problem of the relation of things in themselves to appear-
ances, see Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and
Defense, in particular the chapter “The Thing in Itself and the Problem of Affection.”
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them different aspects of the thing are revealed to me. The whole
object is not given to me all at once. Furthermore, our very thinking
is discursive; we first think one representation and then another.
Hence what we are given through our successive apprehensions is a
series of successive appearances. That we think of things as enduring
(duration) throughout the states of their changes (succession) is a
consequence of this mode of representation, together with the possi-
bility of objective experience. As a result of ourmode of apprehending
what is given to us in sensation, the manifold of intuition contains
parts that cannot be given all at once in a single representation. In
other words, those things that are “coincidentally different” in our
apprehension of the manifold are given “not as within one another,
but outside one another.” As such, given our mode of representation,
“the whole expresses itself to us only in a series of appearances, in
which all is together which may only be together for our faculty
of representation, and all is separate, which must be separate as a
consequence of the same.” Were we to abstract from our mode of
representation, we might imagine how another being without our
limitations would think what we must apprehend successively. Such
a being would “have a faculty of representation different from our
own.” A being that can represent the thing in itself would view it as
“one, without duration and succession,” that is, it would represent all
of it at once, in a single intellectual intuition. As such it would view
“the preformed seed of all those appearances, the ground of all those
relations of things to others from which the appearances develop
themselves.”
This passage from Spinozism can easily lead us to conclude that
Schleiermacher understands the noumena and the appearances to
be one and the same thing, viewed from two points of view.
Schleiermacher does not speak of the noumenon as something dif-
ferent from the appearances. There are not two things or two worlds,
the world of noumena and the world of phenomena. The noumenon
does not stand outside the appearances, acting as their cause. It is
true that Schleiermacher speaks of the noumenon as the ground of
the appearances. But such talk of the noumenon as ground need not
commit him to thinking of the two as constituting two worlds. The
noumenon grounds phenomena only in the sense that, were we to
be capable of an intellectual intuition, we would see that everything
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that appears phenomenally is already contained in the noumenon.
God, as “ground” of the world does not stand outside of the appear-
ances. This, of course, rules out the theistic vision in which God is
understood as different from the world, as existing independently
of it, and creating it “out of nothing.” Schleiermacher’s reading of
Spinoza also seems to rule out panentheism. In panentheism, there is
a distinction between God and world, but the world is “in” God. Still,
on this view God is yet more than the world. What Schleiermacher
seems to espouse here, however, is more pantheistic in nature. Insofar
as Schleiermacher puts forward a double aspect view of the relation
of noumena to phenomena, the view coheres with a thoroughgoing
identification of God and world.
Spinoza’s philosophy contains a related point, and no doubt this
is one of the main reasons that Schleiermacher believed that the two
philosophers were saying essentially the same thing. In proposition 18
of the Ethics, Spinoza claims, “God is the immanent, not the transitive
cause of all things.” A transitive cause stands outside of its effect,
that is, the effect lies beyond the cause. Not so with an immanent
cause. The effect of an immanent cause cannot even be conceived
apart from it. As Spinoza notes in demonstrating this proposition,
“Everything that is, is in God, and must be conceived through God.”
Moreover, Spinoza claims, “outside of God there can be no substance,
that is, a thing which is in itself outside God.”31 Insofar as God
is an “immanent” cause there is an important sense in which God
cannot be distinguished from the world, that is, nature is not a sub-
stance independent of God. The demonstration of Spinoza’s Propo-
sition 28, reproduced in its entirety in Jacobi’s text and copied by
Schleiermacher, contains similar claims. Its concluding lines affirm,
“But all things that are, are in God, and so depend on God that
they can neither be nor be conceived without him.”32 Schleiermacher
adopts this understanding of the way that God relates to the world. He
notes, “The infinite thing does not bring forth finite things and what
belongs to them in a transitive way, not insofar as one is destroyed
by the other, but rather only insofar as all belong to the eternal,
unchangeable being” (KGA I.1, 529). The question, of course, still
31 Benedict de Spinoza, A Spinoza Reader: the Ethics and Other Works, 100.
32 Ibid. 104; cf. KGA I.1, 514.
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remains whether God completely exhausts God-self in nature, so
that God and nature can be completely identified.33 Jacobi certainly
understood Spinoza in this way, as is attested by the sixth paragraph
of his forty-four paragraphs describing Spinoza’s system. There he
notes that “Therefore, the finite is in the infinite, so that the embodi-
ment of all finite things is one and the same with the infinite thing, as
in each moment it encompasses the whole of eternity, past and future
in the same way” (KGA I.1, 514–15). Schleiermacher is working with
this interpretation of Spinoza. And in light of this interpretation, it
makes eminent sense to think of God and world as identical, only
viewed from two different points of view.34
Schleiermacher argues that the view he puts forward here “can
also be attributed to the Leibnizian” (KGA I.1, 526). What can he
possibly mean here? He later notes, in agreement with Jacobi, that the
Leibnizian position—when understood correctly—must ultimately
dissolve into Spinozism. There he claims, “Now admittedly this per-
sonal God is not the cause of the world, and I have, after all, clearly
shown that Leibniz, too, must arrive at such an idea of the deity”
(KGA I.1, 532). In other words, he argues that given Leibniz’s presup-
positions, Leibniz cannot consistently hold to a creatio ex nihilo, and
Leibniz’s position is ultimately non-theistic. In §36 of theMonadology
Leibniz had noted “there is an infinity of past and present shapes and
motions that enter into the efficient cause of my present writing, and
there is an infinity of small inclinations and dispositions of my soul,
present and past, that enter into its final cause.”35 This means that the
33 Curley, in particular, questions whether a careful reading of Spinoza warrants
an identification of the one substance with the whole of nature. He refers to Letter
43, and notes “Spinoza is in fact contending, against Velthuysen, that his having said
that all things emanate necessarily from the nature of God does not commit him to
holding that the universe is God. I take this letter to be a clear rejection of that kind of
pantheism.” Behind the Geometrical Method, pp. 36ff, 149, n. 52.
34 Paul Franks characterizes this move as one common to the German Idealists:
“When they reject Kant’s Two Essences view, the German idealists adopt what is in
effect a Two Aspects view: the empirical aspect of a thing corresponds to the way
in which a thing’s being as it is, is ground in its relations to other things within the
totality; the transcendental aspect of a thing corresponds to the way in which a thing’s
being as it is, is grounded in its relation to the totality and ultimately to the totality’s
absolute first principle. On this view, there is one world, understandable in two ways,
or from two standpoints” Paul W. Franks, All or Nothing, 145.
35 Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 217.
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ultimate ground of the state of any thing is completely determined
by causes lying outside of it, causes that go back to infinity. However,
Leibniz argues, if such efficient causes go back into infinity, we can-
not give a sufficient reason for the state of anything unless we look
outside the infinite series of conditioned beings. In §37 he claims,
“It must be the case that the sufficient or ultimate reason is outside
the sequence or series of this multiplicity of contingencies, however
infinite it may be.”36 And in §38, Leibniz continues, “And this is why
the ultimate reason of things must be in a necessary substance in
which the diversity of changes is only eminent, as in its source.”37
The sufficient reason for the infinite series of conditioned beings lies
eminently in God.
Why does Schleiermacher believe this leads to Spinozism? There
are two reasons, both intimately related. First, if the state of each thing
depends upon an infinite series of efficient causes, and if, moreover,
this state itself determines all future states onto infinity, then there is
a sense in which this state of the thing cannot be conceived through
itself, since it stands in interdependence with all other elements in
the series that lie outside of it. It can only be completely conceived
through the whole world system, the elements of which mutually
determine each other, and which thereby determine it. But since this
system is infinite, it can only find its sufficient reason in God, who
stands outside the series and contains all determinations of what
occurs in the world only eminently. As such, the state of a thing can-
not be conceived through itself; it can ultimately only be completely
grasped (in terms of its sufficient reason) in relation to the infinite
series of all finite things and in relation to the One that contains this
series eminently. Second, given the fact that things are continuously
coming into being and passing away (and changing into one another),
what is the principle of individuation through which we are to mark
off the beginning of one individual and the end of another? There is
only one continuously identifiable substrate that takes on changing
determinations, namely extension itself, which Schleiermacher con-
ceives of in an organic sense. Hence, Schleiermacher notes, given the
“alternating bringing forth and destruction of the organic parts of its
36 Ibid. 218. 37 Ibid.
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extent [the extent of the world soul],” “finite individuals . . . are not
absolute.” We therefore have, “once again, Spinozism.”
A similar kind of reasoning lies behind Schleiermacher’s claim
that “If a noumenon should be the ground of the whole series of
appearances from seed to tree, then this series may not end here, it
must extend itself to all previous trees and seeds and those that fol-
low . . . This series must extend throughout the whole world of sense,
and we thereby come once more to the Spinozistic relation.” If the
tree stands in complete interdependence with the series of events that
lie outside of it, on what grounds do I mark off the noumenal ground
of the tree from the noumenal grounds of all other things that I think
are different from the tree, but upon which the coming to be of the
tree depended? Moreover, in thinking of the noumenal ground of this
tree, I must think of the whole series and its relation to God, which
contains this series eminently. But I must think of the same series and
its relation to God when I try to give a sufficient reason for another
tree. The sufficient reason, and hence the noumenal ground of both
trees, is the same. If the same noumenon grounds this tree and a
future tree, on what grounds can I provide a noumenal distinction
between the two trees? It is these kinds of considerations that lead
Schleiermacher to affirm the Spinozistic idea that there is only one
substance.38
Whereas in Spinozism Schleiermacher attempts to work out a view
consistent with both Kant and Spinoza, in his Short Presentation
Schleiermacher focuses on the differences between the two. He notes,
“It cannot be claimed straight out, that the infinite thing relates to the
38 For an excellent discussion of similar and related problems and how they drive
post-Kantian Spinozism, see Franks, All or Nothing, in particular chapter two. Franks
identifies what he calls Holistic Monism, a version of German Idealism that he argues
is incompatible with one of Kant’s fundamental commitments (namely that there
are many noumenal agents). Two important characteristics of philosophical systems
that embody holistic monism are the following: First, “the Holistic requirement is
that, in an adequate philosophical system, empirical items must be such that all
their properties are determinable only within the context of a totality composed
of other items and their properties.” Second, “the Monistic requirement is that, in
an adequate philosophical system, the absolute first principle must be immanent
within the aforementioned totality, as its principle of unity” (85). Both require-
ments follow from Spinoza’s understanding of substance as that which can be con-
ceived through itself, that is, that which requires nothing outside of itself for its
intelligibility.
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finite in the same way in Spinoza as in Kant. For otherwise Spinoza
would have had to discover the critical philosophy before Kant”
(KGA I.1, 573). Moreover, he grants that from the standpoint of the
critical philosophy, nothing can be said about things in themselves.
Critical idealism could not “presume to go further” and to attribute
to the noumenon “a positive unity and infinity.” Of this “it could
know nothing” (KGA I.1, 574). He is aware of the critical distinction
between logical grounds and real grounds, and defends Spinoza from
the accusation that he has mixed up the two (KGA I.1, 564–5). He
notes that he himself had been tempted to think that Spinoza had
made this mistake. He concludes, however, that Spinoza came to the
conclusion that “there must be an infinite thing, in which everything
finite exists,” because all things are in flux, and no existence can be
attributed to such things when they are considered in themselves
(KGA I.1, 564–5); he thereby claims that Spinoza does not conclude
to the existence of an infinite thing through a confusion of logical and
real grounds. How Schleiermacher arrives at this conclusion remains
unclear.
Schleiermacher’s own argument concerning the noumenal ground
of the tree, discussed above, does seem to ignore the distinction
between logical and real grounds. As Kant had noted, it is “evident
beyond all possibility of doubt, that if the conditioned is given, a
regress in the series of all its conditions is set as a task”. One must,
however, distinguish between logical and real grounds. A logical
ground has to do with propositions. It requires that if a given
proposition is posited, we must also assume that all its conditions
or premises are presupposed. This is “simply the logical requirement
that we should have adequate premises for any given conclusion”
(KRV A500/B529). In the case of states of affairs, however, we move
from some actual, conditioned state of affairs, to another state of
affairs that conditions it. According to Kant, however, this search for
conditions is an “empirical synthesis.” In an empirical synthesis, the
conditions are only accessible through the activity of the synthesis
itself. Given that what is given in empirical intuition must conform
to the forms of intuition, space and time, and that what can be
given through these are mere relations,39 it is impossible for the
39 Critique of Pure Reason,  66–7.
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unconditioned (itself not conditioned by its relation to anything
else) to be given in intuition. Moreover, the contribution of the
subject in the activity of this synthesis cannot be ignored.40 This
means that the imperative to search for the conditions for any given
conditioned is only set as a regulative task. Since the elements of the
synthesis must always be given to us successively through the forms of
intuition, we cannot assume that once the conditioned is posited, all
of the conditions are given along with it. Schleiermacher’s argument
regarding the noumenal ground of the tree, however, seems to
ignore just this distinction. He assumes that we can inquire into the
sufficient ground of each appearance, and thereby concludes that
such a ground can only be grasped completely in terms of the whole
series of appearances (the whole of the world) as well as in terms of
what contains this series eminently. Hence he believes that once the
conditioned appearance is given, wemust assume that all of its condi-
tions (the world as a whole, and God as its ground) is also given. Only
in this way can hemove beyond Kant’s affirmation of the unknowable
character of things in themselves and affirm that because the same
ground conditions all appearances, there can be only one noumenon.
Significantly, Kant had recognized that if space and time are
thought of as features of things in themselves, Spinozism results. In
the Critique of Practical Reason he argued that
if this ideality of time and space is not assumed, only Spinozism remains, in
which space and time are essential determinations of the original being itself,
while the things dependent upon it (ourselves, therefore, included) are not
substances but merely accidents inhering in it. For if these things exist only
as its effects in time, which would then be the condition of their existence
itself, the actions of these beings would have to be merely its actions, which
it performs anywhere and at any time. Spinozism, therefore, in spite of the
absurdity of its basic idea, argues far more cogently than the creation theory
can . . . (KprV 5:101–2)
What is given in intuition is always conditioned; it always stands
in relation to something else and cannot be grasped outside of
40 On this point, see Henry Allison’s discussion in Kant’s Transcendental Idealism,
53ff. See also Michelle Grier, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion, in particular
chapters three and four.
03-Marina-c02 OUP191-Marina (Typeset by SPi, Delhi) page 71 of 75 March 6, 2008 11:38
The Principle of Individuation 71
this relation. If we are transcendental realists and think that space
and time are features of things in themselves, then we must also
assume that things in themselves can be completely described in
terms of these spatial and temporal features, which, however, only
exhibit things as they stand in relation to one another. If things
in themselves are spatial and temporal, their properties, too, are
intrinsically relational. But if all we have are things whose prop-
erties are all intrinsically relational (such that each thing and its
properties cannot be grasped outside of its relation to other things),
there can then be no plurality of genuine substances, each of
which must contain the principle of its own activity within itself
if it is to be a substance. Instead, the action of all phenomenal
beings must be thought of as the temporal effects of a single,
unconditioned being, and hence we come back to the Spinozis-
tic relation. While Schleiermacher adopts the Kantian view of the
ideality of space and time, in Spinozism he does not address why
Kant believed that transcendental idealism blocks the Spinozistic
conclusion. He demonstrates more awareness of this in the Short
Presentation where he notes that while “Spinoza likewise proceeds
from the universal problem, to find the unconditioned from the
conditioned . . .Kant at least allows the thought of an unconditioned
outside of the series of appearances. Spinoza thought no other uncon-
ditioned is possible than the complete totality of the conditioned”
(KGA I.1, 574).
Schleiermacher’s preferred argument for the claim that there is
only one thing that really exists has to do with the constant flux of
appearances. In a remarkable passage in Spinozism Schleiermacher
affirms:
My sensualization is not taken from the object of space, but from time.
However, the application is easy and natural. The actual true and real in the
soul is the feeling of Being, the immediate concept, as Spinoza calls it. This,
however, can never be perceived. Only individual concepts and expressions
of the will can be perceived, and apart from these, there exists nothing else in
the soul at any moment of time. Can one for this reason say that individual
concepts have their distinct, individual being? No, nothing actually exists
except the feeling of Being: the immediate concept. Individual concepts are
only its revelations. Can one say that the immediate concept exists only as
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thinking in another? By no means. The immediate concept is the actual,
essential ground of the soul. All those individual concepts inhere in its modes
(understanding and will). Yet admittedly, onemust not go on from this to say
that the immediate concept is the sum of the individual concepts.
(KGA I.1, 535)
Schleiermacher does not proceed from the problem of the constant
flux of appearances in space (as does Plato), but rather from the
successive character of the apprehensions given to the understanding.
Hence he notes that his own argument is “not taken from the object
of space, but from time.” Schleiermacher affirms, along with Kant,
that time is the form of inner sense, that is, it is given in and through
the way that the self successively apprehends the manifold.41 And it
is from the successive and fleeting character of these apprehensions
that Schleiermacher proceeds to build his argument. These are what
consciousness perceives, although they have no genuine subsistence
in themselves, and hence have no real existence. What is real is “the
feeling of Being, the immediate concept.” The successive moments in
the river of the soul’s life—representations and desires— “are only its
revelations.”
A passage from the Short Presentation sheds light on what
Schleiermacher means here. The passage in question is one in
which Schleiermacher argues against the idea of an extramundane
cause of the world. If the “infinite Monad” creates the world in such
a way that it relates to a world that exists outside of it, “with what
right does the infinite Monad not belong to the world?” For example,
if we think of God as a kind of first cause, then we are thinking of God
as standing in the same series of causes as all intra-mundane causes,
and we cannot adequately distinguish God from the world. He notes,
“It is, after all, the same in kind as the finite ones that make up the
world, and between the two there is no other difference than that of
degree, and this is not sufficient.” Moreover the difference between
the infinite Monad and the world cannot be the “immediacy,” with
which the infinite Monad represents the world. Such an idea is “inde-
fensible, since representation cannot in any way be thought without
a medium.” Therefore, either the infinite Monad has
41 “space and time make up what is characteristic of our form of representation”
(KGA I.1, 575).
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its own Monad-body, and is thereby a single individual, in the wretched
sense in which the Godhead, according to Spinoza, is impossible, or the
whole world is its body and thereby with it makes up only one thing. Were
Leibnizianism to count on the possibility of thought without a medium, then
at least it is easy to show that this cannot contain a single representation nor
single determinations of the will. It is therefore something undetermined,
which, after all, cannot be real without determinations, and so we would be
once again back to Spinoza. (KGA I.1, 570)
If the infinite Monad has its own representations and determinations
of the will that are distinct from the world, then it is an individual in
the same way that all finite things are individuals, and there can only
be a difference of degree between the finite and the infinite. This is
the “wretched sense in which the Godhead is impossible” according
to Spinoza, for then it would be one individual among others. Yet
God cannot be counted among the number of individuals, for God
does not stand under a common genus with things.42 We can have
no “general concept,” of God, and as such, we cannot “give God the
name of an individual;” in other words, God is not a thing among
things, or an individual among individuals. But this is exactly how
we think of God when we to try “distinguish God from the finite
things,” and think of God as “outside of them,” that is, when we
think of the world as different from God and God’s determinations
(KGA I.1, 569). If on the other hand, the infinite Monad is thought
of as having no determinations, then it is nothing. The only other
viable alternative, Schleiermacher argues, is to think of the world
as God’s determinations, and this brings us back to the Spinozistic
relation.43
If God is not an individual among others, as Schleiermacher
argues, then God can never be an object for consciousness. As
Schleiermacher notes, the immediate concept—the feeling of Being,
“can never be perceived.” How then do we relate to it? It is given
42 So Schleiermacher, “subsumption under numbers takes place only then, and in
the things that one has brought under a common genus” (KGA I.1, 568–9).
43 Lessing put forward a similar idea in his On the Reality of Things Outside God,
where he argues that God does not reduplicate finite things such that they exist
“outside” of God’s ideas. Rather, finite things are identical with these ideas. See Lessing:
Philosophical and Theological Writings, 32–33. For an analysis of Lessing’s argument,
see Henry E. Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment, 70ff.
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through the transcendental unity of apperception, in virtue of which
all my representations are mine. Just like the immediate concept, this
transcendental unity is not itself a representation. It is, rather, that
function in virtue of which representations are brought to a unity. As
such it is given immediately and never appears. It is the ground of
all the self ’s representations, and not merely their sum.44 By the time
he gives his lectures on Dialectic (the first set of lectures was given in
1811), Schleiermacher provides a much more nuanced account of the
way he conceives the transcendental unity of apperception to relate
to the immediate concept. There he claims that “the transcendental,”
as that which both grounds and surpasses consciousness, “is also the
idea of Being in itself under two kinds or forms and modes that are
contrary and yet related to one another, namely, the ideal and the real,
as conditions of the reality of knowledge.”45 Later on in the Dialectic
he affirms that we can “completely abstract” from the distinction
“between the transcendent and the transcendental.”46 The distinction
is one coined by Kant: when we speak of the transcendental, we
speak merely of the conditions of the possibility of experience, and
hence too, of the activity of the transcendental subject in making
44 As Sarah Schmidt notes in Die Konstruktion des Endlichen, “Das unmittelbare
Selbstbewußtsein eint jedoch nicht nur die einzelnen Akte des Bewußtseins (ähn-
lich der Kantischen transzendentalen Apperception), sondern geht über das einzelne
Subjekt oder Ich hinaus, indem es die Einheit des leidenden und handelnden Sub-
jektes ist und als solche auch das Sein des Anderen einschließt, es ist ‘gleichür-
prungliches Sein des Selbst und des anderen,’ unser ‘Für-uns-Selbst-Sein umfaßt
unser gesamtes Sein für-anderes.’ Da wir auch in unmittelbaren Selbstbewußtsein
uns nicht als Stifter dieser Einheit erfahren, sondern sich uns vielmehr im Mangel
ein Verweis auf etwas über uns Hinausgehendes zeigt, spricht Schleiermacher daher
auch von einen “Abhängigkeitsgefühl” (159–60). Nevertheless, it is important to keep
in mind, as I argue in the rest of the book, that a careful reading of the mature
Schleiermacher shows that he does not simply identify the transcendent ground of
consciousness with ultimate reality itself, but that rather, it is a rift in the immediate
self-consciousness that signals the self ’s relation to ultimate reality. The idea is nicely
captured byManfred Frank in the introduction to his 2001 edition of Schleiermacher’s
Dialectic: “Das, was dem unmittelbaren Selbstbewußtsein [oder Gefühl] einleuchtet,
wenn es zwischen dem einem und dem anderen Pol der Reflektions-Spaltung hin und
herflackert, ist also nicht etwa die positive Fülle einer überreflexiven Identität, sondern
vielmehr dasNegative von derenMangel ” (92). See also Frank’s chapter “Metaphysical
foundations: A look at Schleiermacher’s Dialectic” in The Cambridge Companion to
Friedrich Schleiermacher, especially 26–33.
45 Dialektik: Aus Schleiermachers handscriftlichem Nachlasse, edited by L. Jonas,
Berlin: 1839, . Abt. Bd. 4/2, 77.
46 Ibid. 38.
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experience possible. The transcendent, however, is that which lies
beyond the limits of all possible experience.47 Here the transcendent
and the transcendental are identified in that the idea of Being, as the
unity between the real and the ideal, must be assumed as a condition
of the possibility of knowledge. Despite his familiarity with Kant’s
arguments against the possibility of knowledge of the transcendent,
in Spinozism Schleiermacher had already come to the conclusion that
it is through the transcendental activity of the self that the soul comes
into contact with what is genuinely real. At this point, however, he
does not believe that there is a genuine principle of individuation, or
that the soul is a genuine substance. As such, there is no ground of
personal identity. This is the subject of our next chapter.
47 See Critique of Pure Reason, 295/ 352.
